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are to attain. To work this problem correctly is the test of a good(
administrator, as its soltution depends on a careful consideration andl
a jiist appreciation of the principles of war. To dlrill and discipline
in peace time, aln army at all commensurate wvith the nee,l of Canada.
if she were obligedo to nnldertake a serioiis war, is evidently out of
the question. Consequlently all that can be attempted( is to maintain
in a fair state of efficiency a small force which woiuld on the threat
of hostilities serve as a neiiclets and a trainilng school of one muchl
larger. With this object in view it woild in my opinion be bettert
that wvith a given sum of iiioney the efficiency should be increased
even at the expense of a reducition in numbers. A short period of
-warning must always preceed the ontbreak of hostilities, and to formn
an army the employment of a comparatively small number of trained
men wouild be of' greater service than the assistance which could be
affordecl by a larger number who merely possessed the rudiments of
military instriuctions. The next question is the composition of this
force, including the proportions which the artillery, engineers and
cavalry should bear to the infantry. This should be determined
partly by the experienlce of other nations, especially in recent wars,
partly in reference to the character of the country in which the
army would be required to act. For instance in the greater portionl
of Canada there is little ground for the action of cavalry organizedl
similarily to that of European armies, although for mounted infantry
there might be considerable scope, and this qtuestion of the best
method of oirganizing and arming horsemenr requiires deep considera-
tion and a careful studly of recent campaigins especially of those of
the great American civil war. It is, 1 believe, the opiriion of General
Sheridan, an officer of the highest reputation in the United States
army, formed from his peisonal experience during the civil war in
all branches of his profession, checked and supplemented by what
he observed duriiing the tiiime he was a spectator from the German
side of' the war with France, that the teachings of modern campaigns
shew the desirability of augmenting the mounted infantry, or cavalry
armed with goold rifles and taught to fight on foot, at the expense of
the airtillery. No doubt there is miuch that may be iurged on thec
other side, but tlhis instance is given with the view of showing that
moderln military history together with ajust estimate of the probable
theatre of war should influence the decision of those whose duty it is
to organiize an army.
VWith regard to artillery there can be no questioii biut tliat
guns a re of great value, especially as giving confidelcce to